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"I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and 
express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot 
measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a 
meagre and unsatisfactory kind." 
Lord Kelvin  
 
“How did Lord Kelvin know that?” 
Elio Fratarolli 
 
Introductory Remarks 
   The Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) movement crystallized in the early 
1990’s at McMaster University in Canada (3). The movement originally 
challenged practitioners to validate their treatments based on reasoning and 
clinical studies rather than personal authority (9). In this essay, I will argue 
that, contrary to this wholesome intention, EBM is authoritarian in spirit and 
actually constricts discourse about how to make clinical decisions. 
 
Epistemological Biases of EBM 
   The phrase “evidence-based” implies that EBM has the sole right to define 
what evidence is and that the alternative must be superstition-based 
medicine. EBM uses this authoritarian stance to uphold an evidence 
hierarchy by which to assign how much weight to give clinical studies. From 
highest to lowest in standing, the ranking of studies is: systematic reviews of 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs), meta-analyses of RCTs, individual 
RCTs, nonrandomized or uncontrolled trials, and expert opinion (e.g. see 
table 1 in ref 5). There are some variations in the schemata proposed but two 
factors are constant: 1) RCTs and reviews of RCTs are at the top of the 
hierarchy and 2) clinical sources other than formal studies are either not 
mentioned or appear at the bottom of the hierarchy as expert opinion.  
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   One of EBM’s most famous statements vividly describes the implications 
of the evidence hierarchy (3):  
 
Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and 
patholophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical decision-making, and 
stresses the examination of evidence from clinical research. 
 
Thus, clinical experience (including subconscious knowing and intuition) 
and theory-based reasoning are ejected from discourse or are relegated to the 
bottom of the hierarchy. Moreover, even within the clinical study category, 
the use of randomization and control groups is favored over all other 
conceivable characteristics that could make a study good (e.g. study size, 
similarity of study to target population, quality of outcome measures). I 
often ask myself the question: is this way of viewing evidence the only valid 
perspective and is it even a reasonable perspective? In the following 
sections, I consider some problems with a strict EBM approach with special 
focus on psychiatry. 
 
 
Problem 1: Assumption that treatment and physician are readily 
separable 
   The technology of RCTs presupposes that the treatment can neatly be 
separated from the treater. Although this may be true for pills that affect the 
same receptors no matter who prescribes them, I believe that in 
psychotherapy, the therapist matters as much as the treatment approach. 
Specifically, therapist attributes such as degree of self-acceptance, comfort 
with the range of human emotions, and emotional attunement are likely to 
matter immensely in outcomes. Imagine, for example a patient who suffered 
great humiliation in childhood and therefore acts in rejecting ways towards 
others so as not to risk humiliation. Common counterstransference 
enactments with such patients include acting overly indulgent or defensive; 
both reactions result from the therapist’s struggle to acknowledge and/or 
make use of their own anger in useful ways. Another example of the 
importance of the therapist’s capacities is in the ability to experience 
intimacy; a therapist fear of intimacy could result in sending a patient subtle 
cues not to reveal feelings towards the therapist. If we restrict our attention 
to RCTs that typically study one variable per study at great cost in time and 
labor, we will likely wait decades or centuries before considering the rich 
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interactions between therapist, patient, and theoretical framework that are 
likely to exist. 
 
Problem 2: De-emphasis of inner experience  
   A second problem with EMB in psychotherapy is that the implicit 
denigration of inner experience and intuition robs the psychotherapist of 
important tools. The value of a therapist’s inner experience is eloquently 
described by psychoanalytic author Nancy McWilliams (6): 
 
Differentiating between an essentially depressive and an essentially self-defeating 
individual . . . turns on the therapist’s noticing that instead of feeling sympathy for a 
suffering person, he or she is feeling a sadistic inclination to criticize. The realization that 
one may be dealing with a psychopathic person may come via the therapist’s noticing that 
he or she feels duped or contemptuously bested. The appreciation of a paranoid core 
under an ostensibly depressive presentation may emerge from the therapist’s noting an 
anxiety-filled fantasy that the patient will file a malpractice suit.  
 
The point is that our subjective reactions to patients can direct us to 
important understandings about patients in ways that external observations 
and statistical analysis may miss.   
 
Problem 3: Limitations of numerical scales 
   A further limitation of EBM in psychotherapy is that commonly-used 
symptom-focused scales do not reflect the potential richness of outcomes. 
Consider, for example, the following vignette told by a psychodynamic 
therapist (2): a middle-aged woman presented with anxiety and panic attacks 
that began after she and her family moved to a new city. Her husband, who 
had a new job, was away from home much more than he had previously 
been. Her husband’s absences triggered anger which was rapidly covered up 
by anxiety. Through the therapist’s persistence, the patient began to allow 
herself to experience anger. Soon after, the patient was able to associate her 
anger with childhood experiences of a sick mother who was in and out of 
hospitals until dying when the patient was 12. In fact, she had stomped out 
of her mother’s hospital in anger one day before her mother’s death; her 
mother’s unresponsiveness had elicited the patient’s fury. The guilt was too 
much and the memories of her mother’s death and funeral were repressed 
until initiating psychotherapy. As a result of the therapy process, the patient 
saw that, “she had nothing to do with the death and . . . was able to feel 
compassion for the little girl who had to face her mother’s death alone.” The 
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patient was also able to “face all the grief she experienced while her mother 
was alive but chronically sick and unavailable.” This vignette illustrates the 
kind of gains that are not easily captured by simple numerical scales such as 
the Beck Depression Inventory. EBM in its current form is therefore unable 
to distinguish between the above treatment and symptomatic improvements 
from lorazepam or fluoxetine. In theory, one could devise scales to 
“measure” these deeper changes. However, until cumbersome studies are 
conducted, such observations are considered hearsay and are off the radar of 
EBM.   
 
Problem 4: Under-emphasis on descriptive research 
    Many findings of great clinical relevance do not come from RCTs. 
Consider, for example, the landmark work of attachment theorists such as 
John Bowlby, Mary Ainsworth, and Mary Main. These researchers teach us 
that children adopt very specific strategies in order to maximize the 
likelihood of receiving care from their caregivers; the strategies are called 
secure attachment, avoidant attachment, ambivalent attachment, and 
disorganized attachment (4).  An avoidantly attached child, for instance, 
shows few signs of distress in distressing situations because he or she has 
learned that showing the appropriate emotions actually elicit negative 
responses from the caregiver. This developmental experience could 
undoubtedly harden into fixed attributions about others as the child becomes 
an adult. The relevance of this understanding for psychotherapy seems 
transparent yet the absence of RCTs in attachment research means that EBM 
offers little reason to take note of the important findings. 
 
 
Problem 5: Sanitized RCT Populations 
   RCTs are usually designed to study a single intervention in a single 
condition. Potentially confounding conditions (i.e. comorbidities) are 
therefore excluded. This approach has the advantage of good internal 
validity: the intervention can more easily be shown to affect the condition. 
However, the omission of comorbidities also raises the question of whether 
external validity is thereby compromised: in other words, do the results 
apply to individuals who are unlike the patients in RCT study populations 
(in that they have multiple conditions which may interact in complex ways)? 
For example, numerous RCTs show that antidepressants are effective in 
treating symptoms of major depression in people without comorbid 
personality disorders. Are antidepressants effective for patients with major 
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depression and personality disorders? Does the answer depend on the 
particular personality disorder? Most of the data on antidepressants do not 
address such issues.    
 
Problem 6: Combinatorial issues 
   Systematic reviews of RCTs, the favorite technology of EBM, are most 
helpful in evaluating single interventions for discrete problems. To the 
extent that clinical situations usually involve multiple problems with 
multiple potential interventions, the number of options is large. Accordingly, 
the number of RCTs that would be required to create a truly “evidenced-
based” world could be staggering. Saver and Kalafut (2001), for example, 
based estimates of necessary comparison trials on the number of agents 
approved or in late phase III clinical trials for Alzheimer’s disease or 
ischemic stroke (7):   
  
Possible combination regimens number 128 (27) for Alzheimer disease and 32 
(25) for ischemic stroke. Hierarchical, serial clinical trials would permit identification 
of the optimum combination of these agent classes for Alzheimer disease 
through 127 trials, enrolling 63,500 patients, requiring 286 years; for ischemic 
stroke through 31 trials, enrolling 186,000 patients, requiring 155 years. 
 
The impracticality requires no further comment. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
   Evidence obtained from clinical experience, basic theories of health and 
disease, and clinical studies is crucial to making good clinical decisions. 
EBM tends to narrow the field of inquiry to RCTs and thereby discourages 
discussion of complex questions of how and when to apply evidence from a 
broad range of sources. In place of EBM’s doctrines, I suggest robust 
discussion of difficult epistemological issues and recognition that there are 
probably many valid perspectives about how to make clinical judgements.  
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